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Executive Summary  
Introduction to the Conflict Research 
Programme 
 
The overall goal of the Conflict Research Programme 
(CRP) is to provide an evidence-based strategic re-
orientation of international engagement in places 
apparently afflicted by the world’s most intractable violent 
conflicts. Its premise is that in these places, the ability of 
public authorities to provide even the most basic level of 
governance is subject to the functioning of the ‘real 
politics’ of gaining, managing and holding power, which we 
argue functions as a ‘political marketplace’. This approach 
helps explain the frustrations of state-building and 
institutionally-focused engagement; it can also inform the 
design of improved interventions, which reduce the risk 
and impact of conflict and violence in developing 
countries, alleviating poverty and insecurity. A key 
objective of our research, and a key contribution to the 
‘Better Delivery’ agenda within DFID, is to make policies 
better targeted, more nuanced and rooted in a clear 
understanding of the social condition that undergirds 
persistent contemporary conflict.  
 
The locations for research are Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Iraq, Somalia, South Sudan and Syria. Our central 
hypothesis is that governance in these difficult places is 
dominated by the logic of a political marketplace. These 
political markets are turbulent, violent and integrated into 
regional and global networks of power and money. We also 
hypothesise that moral populism (most visible in identity 
politics, persecuting ideologies and violent extremism) is a 
counterpart to the marketisation of politics, and the two 
flourish in conditions of persistent uncertainty, conflict and 
trauma. Current policy frameworks and tools can neither 
capture the everyday realities of politics and governance in 
these difficult places, nor adjust to the dynamics of 
contested power relations. External interventions risk 
being enmeshed in logics of power and may end up 
inadvertently supporting violence and authoritarianism. At 
the same time, in all war-torn spaces, there are relatively 
peaceful zones: what we term ‘pockets of civicness’. These 
might be territorial (local ceasefires, or inclusive local 
authorities) social (civil society groups helping the 
vulnerable or countering sectarian narratives, or 
customary courts solving disputes fairly) or external 
(interventions that regulate flows of political finance). 
 
The CRP will generate evidence-based, operationally 
relevant research that can enable real-time analysis of the 
dynamics of conflict, contestation, ‘civicness’ and public 
authority, enabling better interventions to manage and 
resolve armed conflict, reduce violence, and create 
conditions for more accountable and transparent 
governance. A core component of the CRP is to contribute 
to a better understanding of “what works” in addressing 
violent conflict across our research sites. We will develop 
comparative understanding of how different interventions 
affect violent conflict and the risk of renewed violent 
conflict, across our research sites. We will also examine 
the contextual factors that affect the effectiveness of 
these interventions. Intervention areas selected for 
comparative research: Security interventions; civil society 
and community mediation interventions; resource 
interventions; and interventions designed to strengthen 
authority and legitimacy, including at the sub-national level. 
We envisage emerging findings from our political 
economy analysis of conflict drivers to shape our 
comparative analysis of specific interventions.  
 
Our research methods include (a) comparative political 
ethnography (b) refined datasets (c) models of violence 
and political business (d) socio-political mapping of the 
structural drivers of conflict and the groups involved in 
political mobilisation and coercion and (e) action research 
exploring agents of change. We have a unique and robust 
infrastructure of local researchers and civil society 
networks across all our sites that will facilitate both 
fieldwork research and remote research. The CRP team is 
already closely engaged with key political processes – and 
regional actors - in the countries concerned, designed to 
promote peace, humanitarian action, human rights and 
democracy. This engagement is a key part of our method 
and will ensure that evidence-based research is effectively 
communicated to institutions engaged in trying to reduce 
the risk and impact of violent conflict in our research sites. 
Our emphasis is upon a mix of research methods and 
mechanisms for engaging in policy and practice. In line 
with this flexible approach, we will hold an annual in-
country workshop with each DFID country office, and key 
stakeholders, to work through the implications of our 
research for them in a practical, flexible and responsive 
way. This will be supplemented by regular written and face-
to-face/virtual communication with country staff.  
The Horn of Africa 
 
The Horn of Africa (HoA) is home to 220 million people. It 
is one of the most conflict prone areas of the world, 
rendered particularly vulnerable because of its 
strategically critical geographical location, which makes its 
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politics particularly strongly influenced by events in the 
Middle East. Recurrent wars have left its people 
impoverished and often hungry, and its natural 
environment in a precarious condition. The HoA is host to 
more than 40 percent of the world’s United Nations 
peacekeepers; more than 50 percent of the African Union 
mission in Somalia is included. The Red Sea region is 
emerging as a particularly significant flashpoint for 
regional political rivalry and armed conflict. 
 
The Red Sea region straddles Africa and the Middle East. 
It is strategically important for international security, 
especially maritime trade. Partly because the region is 
divided between two continents, it is neglected by 
international policymakers including in HMG. However, 
Gulf countries (especially Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United 
Arab Emirates and Iran) and Egypt are all actively engaged 
in politics and security in the Red Sea, notably in Yemen 
but also with respect to Djibouti, Eritrea, Somalia and 
Sudan. 
 
This synthesis paper analyses a set of issues in the HoA 
and Red Sea region using the framework of the political 
marketplace and moral populism. One striking element of 
the literature search is the scarcity of scholarly work on the 
HoA as a region (as opposed to individual countries), and 
the near-total absence of work on the Red Sea. A second 
is that the politics of the HoA/Red Sea region have been 
dominated by a succession of geo-strategic and regional 
power struggles, of which the current one is between 
Ethiopia and its vision of a regional security order, pursued 
by a mix of military power and state-led economic 
development, and a coalition of Arab countries which see 
the area as part of their security perimeter, and which 
pursue their goals primarily through political financing 
strategies.  
 
The paper provides a brief history of political markets and 
moral populism in the region, outlining how it is 
paradigmatic for the emergence of the political 
marketplace form of governance, and how varieties of 
identity politics have emerged and transformed in 
response to this—including ethnic mobilisation, rival 
Islamisms, and the ‘sleeper issue’ of nationalism. It covers 
the high prevalence of inter-state rivalry and armed conflict 
(direct and by proxy), boundary disputes, and the regional 
organisations, especially the InterGovernmental Authority 
on Development (IGAD) that are engaged in the region’s 
peace and security challenges. 
Introduction 
 
The Horn of Africa and the Red Sea constitute one of the 
most strategically important, complex, volatile and yet 
under-studied regions of the world. Indeed there is no 
shared working definition of the ‘Horn of Africa’ while the 
Red Sea is conspicuous by its absence as an integrated 
unit of security and political analysis. Recent 
developments have meant that the states of the Arabian 
Gulf are also active players in this region. 
 
The Conflict Research Programme identified regional 
dynamics as one of its core areas of interest from the 
outset. This includes two sets of regional dynamics: the 
Horn of Africa/Red Sea (the focus of this paper) and the 
Gulf/Syria/Iraq. The two regional agendas also overlap and 
the research processes and findings will speak to one 
another. For the Gulf countries, the Horn of Africa is a 
second-tier security and political concern. 
 
Scarcity of Scholarly Work on the Region 
 
The Horn of Africa presents huge challenges to scholars 
and policymakers. The region is part of sub-Saharan Africa 
yet profoundly influenced by the Arab world; it is a region 
of unparalleled diversity with very few experts familiar with 
more than one country; it is an area that had a uniquely 
complex colonial experience with a variety of African, Arab 
and European forms of imperial domination; it is unique in 
Africa in that pre-colonial political traditions have 
identifiable continuities in contemporary statecraft and 
governance. Almost all the scholarship and policy analysis 
is concerned with individual countries, and more 
occasionally a single cross-cutting issue such as food 
security. There is remarkably little in the way of regional 
political analyses of the HoA. Recent exceptions are Reid 
(2011), Bereketeab (2013), Mengisteab (2014), de Waal 
(2015) and Clapham (2017). Each of these combines 
national level analysis with attention to regional 
institutions (usually bemoaning their weaknesses), inter-
state rivalries, and border disputes. Some older volumes 
are noteworthy, such as Doornbos et al. (1992), Tvedt 
(1993), Woodward and Forsyth (1994) and Gurdon (1994), 
all of which were written in the immediate aftermath of the 
momentous changes of 1991—described by Clapham 
(2017) as the region’s ‘year zero’. Peter Woodward has also 
written consistently from an international relations 
perspective (Woodward 2002, 2006; also see Woodward 
2013a as an update on his 2002 book). There is also a 
small but significant set of scholarly works that focus on 
ethnicity and nationalism (Lewis 1983; Salih and Markakis 
1999), and a number of collections of ethnographic essays 
that span different countries of the region, highlighting 
common themes (e.g. Markakis and Fukui 1994, Feyissa 
and Hoehne 2010). Additionally, there is a growing set of 
detailed local studies generated within the region, 
including by IGAD and its units such as the Conflict Early 
Warning and Response Network (CEWARN) and its 
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Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution Strategy 
(Wulf and Debiel 2009; IGAD 2013; Woodward 2013b), 
alongside more general policy-focused publications by 
regional think tanks such the Institute for Security Studies, 
the Institute for Peace and Security Studies and the journal 
Discourse. 
 
Analysis of the Red Sea trans-region is scarce to non-
existent. The Red Sea is seen as a fundamental socio-
cultural gulf dividing Africa from south-west Asia; similarly 
it divides the domains of scholarly and policy expertise. Ali 
Mazrui (1986) provocatively asks, if the North African 
countries are seen as part of the continent, why not the 
Arabian Peninsula too? Having identified the historical ties 
that bind the two shores, he writes, ‘The most pernicious 
sea in Africa’s history may well be the Red Sea. This thin 
line of water has been deemed to be more relevant for 
defining where Africa ends than all the evidence of 
geology, geography, history and culture.’ (p. 29) 
 
Few scholars have studied the politics of the Red Sea, with 
Aliboni (1985) standing out as a significant if dated 
account, and Ehteshami and Murphy (2013) as a more 
recent, but still incomplete volume. A Google scholar 
search yields the following totals for publications with any 
combination of ‘peace’ and ‘security’ in the title, along with 
three locations: Red Sea, Persian/Arabian Gulf, and the 
South China Sea. 
 
 Red Sea: 37 
 Persian/Arabian Gulf: 530 
 South China Sea: 43,455 
 
The recent report on peace missions to the African Union 
identified the ‘shared spaces’ between Africa and its 
neighbouring regions, including the Red Sea-Gulf of Aden, 
as a policy priority (WPF 2016). The potential value of 
academic analysis of the Red Sea is amply demonstrated 
by the enduring relevance of the conclusions of one of the 
few books that do exist, namely Roberto Aliboni’s The Red 
Sea Region: Local actors and the superpowers (1985). 
Aliboni identifies three main trends in the politics of the 
region. He writes, ‘Firstly, Saudi Arabia’s regional policies 
aimed at enhancing internal and external security have 
proven destabilising and in a way even adventurous.’ (p. 
116) Examples he provides, from the 1970s, are its 
fostering divisions in Yemen, its role in promoting Somali 
irredentism as a way of reducing Soviet influence, and its 
routine disregard for the norms of the Organisation of 
African Unity (OAU) in supporting separatist movements in 
the Horn. Aliboni’s second trend is the Arab countries’ 
piecemeal financial support for anti-Communist groups 
and for poorer governments ready to make friendly tactical 
moves, which end up stoking local conflicts as a result. He 
sees Saudi Arabia and Libya as guilty of this in different 
ways (p. 117). Third, Aliboni identifies the dominant factor 
in the politics of the Red Sea as relations among Arab 
states, especially the ‘central axis’ of Egypt and Saudi 
Arabia, with those countries’ relations with the HoA derived 
from their primary axis of rivalry in the Levant and 
Peninsular. Each of these trends resonates with the post-
Cold War era, in which the region’s most powerful 
countries—still Egypt and Saudi Arabia—are responding to 
the rivalrous realpolitik and the threat of violent jihadism. 
 
Aliboni concludes his short book by drawing out the 
implications for western countries. 
 
In this uneasy regional context the western countries 
are practically absent. ... While Western absence 
appears remarkable, in view of the crucial importance 
the Red Sea region is supposed to have in the wider 
frame of the area South-east of NATO, this absence 
can hardly be explained today and could hardly be 
excused tomorrow.... On the other hand, a direct 
Western presence in the region may be neither 
necessary nor politically wise. The West has powerful 
and prestigious allies, like Egypt and Saudi Arabia, in 
the Red Sea. If these allies were to discard the 
destabilising policies they have carried out in the past 
and promote instead policies of co-operation both on 
the inter-Arab and Afro-Arab levels, the Western 
countries’ preoccupations with the area will lessen 
remarkably. In the end this would be the most correct 
path to the stabilisation and security of the region, and 
in this sense the most important conclusion of this 
book may be that it is up to the regional countries to 
manage stability around the basin by promoting co-
operation among all the regional actors (pp. 118-9). 
 
Aliboni’s book is now more than three decades old, and 
limited by its preoccupation with the interests of the most 
powerful states, to the neglect of the African countries at 
the southern end of the Sea. It also has little analysis of the 
Israeli interest and role. Nonetheless it is a model for the 
kind of analysis that is strikingly needed today. 
Political Markets in the Horn of Africa 
and Red Sea 
 
The HoA is a paradigmatic instance of the development of 
the political marketplace in the contemporary era (de Waal 
2015). Incorporating Yemen and the countries of the 
Arabian Gulf into an integrated regional analysis further 
illuminates the political economy of conflict in the HoA, 
and also widens and deepens the political marketplace 
framework. 
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In the early part of the colonial era, both shores of the Red 
Sea were part of the Ottoman Empire. The patterns of 
imperial rule, on the ‘hub and spokes’ model, provide an 
adaptable template for neopatrimonial rule (Barkey 2008). 
The Abyssinian Empire was similarly a pre-modern multi-
ethnic land empire, which had many of the same features 
of patrimonial governance (Donham and James 1986). 
The Egyptian empire on the Nile was another variant, 
notable for its use of mercenaries on its slaving frontiers, 
its racism and its development of militarised tribalism as a 
mechanism of peripheral governance (Troutt-Powell 
2003). The region was transformed by the opening of the 
Suez Canal, and the subsequent imperial rivalry for control 
of the Nile headwaters and the Bab al Mandab. Few of the 
territories were occupied by colonial powers with anything 
other than the intent of protecting sea lanes and excluding 
rivals. In the late colonial era, the richest territories in the 
Red Sea region were Egypt and Eritrea, both of which 
appeared set on building modern states, albeit in rather 
different ways.  
 
The HoA/Red Sea was a theatre of Cold War confrontation 
in the 1960s (with the Yemen civil war, which for a moment 
appeared to threaten an Arab nationalist revolution in 
Saudi Arabia) (Wenner 1993) and the 1970s (with the 
spectacular switch of alliances in the Horn, prompting 
Zbigniew Brezinski’s famous phrase that détente ‘lies 
buried in the sands of the Ogaden) (Woodroofe 2013). The 
cost of defeating Communism was that nationalism—the 
one ideology with a proven record of underpinning 
statebuilding—was also in retreat, replaced by a mercantile 
form of politics that was fertile ground for developing the 
political marketplace. 
 
In the 1970s, the oil boom transformed the countries of the 
Arabian/Persian Gulf, and in doing so also radically altered 
their relations with their African near-neighbours and 
Yemen. Today, the economic disparities in the Red Sea 
region are striking. The GDP per capita of the IGAD region 
is $1,000; in the GCC region it is $26,000. The three 
countries at the northern end of the sea (Egypt, Israel and 
Jordan) have a combined GDP of $658 billion; the four 
countries at the southern end (Djibouti, Eritrea, Somalia 
and Yemen) have a combined GDP of just $42 bn. Egypt’s 
GDP at $331 bn is larger than the combined GDP of the 
eight IGAD countries at $255 bn. Saudi Arabia’s GDP is 
$646 bn; the combined GDP of the other GCC countries 
(Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the UAE) is $750 bn.  
 
This astonishing economic transformation began in the 
1970s with the oil boom, at the same moment that the 
Horn was plunged into war and revolution. The explosion 
of employment opportunities in the Gulf, alongside 
economic and political crisis in the HoA, led to an exodus 
of skilled and semi-skilled labour, notably including a huge 
proportion of the Sudanese professional class and very 
large numbers of Somalis. Urban Sudan and Somalia 
rapidly became remittance-based economies (Brown 
1992; Jamal 1988). In the 1980s, the wages earned by 
Sudanese and Somali workers in the Gulf countries 
represented as much as 40 percent of their countries’ 
gross national income, and were the major source of 
investment, especially in real estate and small businesses. 
The Gulf economies not only overshadowed the Sudanese 
and Somali ones, but in a sense also enveloped them. 
Trading companies, set up in the Gulf states during the 
1970s oil boom, owned and managed by Somalis and 
Sudanese, later emerged as major players in those 
countries’ domestic economies. Most Sudanese Islamic 
banks began in this manner, as well as the major Somali 
companies Dahabshiil and Indhadeero.  
 
Arab-African economic relations were also influenced by 
the wave of lending, commercial and concessionary, 
provided by Arab banks after the oil boom. This direct bank 
lending was not, overwhelmingly, driven by a strategic 
developmental vision, but instead by case-by-case 
commercial considerations. 
 
Large scale employment by north-east Africans in the Gulf 
has had far-reaching social, cultural and political 
implications also. The social and religious mores of the 
conservative, often puritanical, forms of Salafi Islam 
common in the Gulf spread to the HoA (and indeed 
elsewhere). Gulf-based charities funded schools and 
mosques, driving a historic shift from Sufiism to 
Wahhabism in public religious life. The visible effects of 
this include changes in dress, especially for women, and 
behaviour codes in public. Although the Saudi government 
has often been held responsible for the spread of 
Wahhabism, it appears that it was only during the 1970s 
that it was actively promoting Islamism in the Horn, as part 
of the Saudi anti-Communist strategy of that time, and the 
principal beneficiaries of this policy were the Sudanese 
Muslim Brothers. Subsequently, the Saudi rulers have dealt 
with heads of state, while permitting private individuals, 
charities and foundations, to pursue their own separate 
agendas, which often include supporting Salafi schools 
and mosques. Qatar has followed a distinct policy, more 
consistently supporting the Muslim Brothers, and the 
Emirates have had a secular foreign policy. 
 
The economic dominance of the Gulf had political impacts, 
often driven directly in finance. In Sudan, Islamic banking 
was permitted from 1977 onwards, directly causing the 
growth of the Muslim Brothers as the best-funded and 
best-organised political force. The growth of political Islam 
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in Sudan was only briefly a goal of the Gulf countries, but it 
provided a strategic opportunity that Sudanese Islamists 
were able to seize.  
 
In Somalia, the principal financial mechanism for 
remittances was a hawala system run by the Somalis 
themselves. Islamic banks and foundations were unable to 
penetrate the country during the Siyad Barre era—despite 
his opening to funds and security support from the Arab 
world, Siyad remained resolutely secular to the end. Since 
the mid-1990s, there has been a pervasive Islamisation of 
public and commercial life in Somalia. Political finance has 
been associated with the money transfer and telecoms 
sector, which is both wealthy and has huge political clout 
(Collins 2009; Phillips 2013). In the last decade Gulf states 
re-emerged as direct providers of political money, 
particularly in the context of federal politics in Mogadishu, 
but during 2016-17 also in Hargeisa.  
 
The political and economic crises in the HoA and Yemen 
in the late 1970s and the protracted civil wars of the 1980s 
brought each of the HoA countries to the point of collapse. 
Somalia did indeed collapse, and Sudan and Ethiopia 
narrowly escaped. As the HoA rebounded economically, it 
did along a strikingly trajectory model to that which had 
gone before. Sudan rebuilt its political economy and 
governance system as a political marketplace, and to the 
extent that Somalia became functional, it was on the same 
model. Ethiopia and Eritrea attempted more conventional 
models of developmental statebuilding. In Eritrea this 
collapsed following the 1998-2000 border war with 
Ethiopia, to be replaced by a tightly-managed dictatorship. 
The one country in the region that has, thus far 
successfully, pursued developmental state path is 
Ethiopia, but this has also been accompanied by growing 
corruption and ethnic politics, which threaten both the 
political stability and the developmental trajectory of the 
Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front 
(EPRDF) government. That experiment is now in peril: the 
choice facing Ethiopia is between an institutionalised form 
of developmental governance, and a political marketplace. 
 
The political economies of Sudan and Somalia developed 
as subordinate players in an economic arena dominated 
the Gulf states and their rulers. The characteristic politics 
of the Gulf states is lineage patrimonialism, both at home 
and abroad: family and money are what count above all 
else. The foreign policies of the Gulf states, when dealing 
with Africa, have been built around personal ties of loyalty. 
Gulf leaders deal with sovereign rulers (in exceptional 
cases, subnational leaders who have acquired some 
international legitimacy), whom they provide with political 
budgets in return for acknowledging the primacy of their 
patrons and following instructions accordingly. This is a 
hierarchical system based on a sovereign order. It is 
separate from private and charitable financing, which 
follow similar patterns but with different goals. The Gulf 
rulers therefore enter the HoA political marketplace as 
political financiers and patrons, sustaining and indeed 
intensifying the monetised patronage relationships that 
already exist. 
 
Therefore, even while the Gulf countries appeared to be 
scaling back their political engagement in the HoA in the 
1990s and 2000s, the conditions were being established 
for far-greater political penetration later on. This recent 
wave of Gulf engagement with the HoA has been driven by 
a host of political and security factors (Obaid 2014), has 
been facilitated by the economic vulnerability of the HoA, 
and has been operationalised through political funding—
direct loyalty payments to political actors. Saudi and 
Emirati political cooperation policies can determine 
financial flows to Sudan, Eritrea and Somalia (de Waal 
2015). While political relationships between the Gulf and 
the HoA are somewhat volatile, economic relationships 
have proved much more stable (Shinn 2017). 
 
Yemen’s history vis-à-vis the Gulf countries is much more 
intimate and complex (Gause 1990; Healy and Hill 2010), 
but has the same fundamental components of a complex, 
violent national political marketplace, with Saudi Arabia 
playing an important and delicate role as political financier 
(Philips 2011, 2016). Since the 2011 uprising in Yemen, the 
country has slid from optimism about transformation to a 
democratic system, to economic and political crisis, civil 
war, and a stalemated internationalised civil war with a 
major humanitarian crisis (Al-Dawsari 2012; Hamidadin 
2015; Hill et al 2013). The country’s financial meltdown lay 
at the heart of its political crisis, causing the crash of a 
monetised political market (Salisbury 2014). Yemen today 
represents an advanced case of a turbulent, 
unmanageable, regionalised political marketplace, 
intermixed with moral populist sectarian politics (Salisbury 
2015).  
Moral Populism in the Horn of Africa 
 
There are few parts of the world with greater diversity than 
the Horn of Africa. The peoples of the HoA have some of 
the world’s oldest and most complex civilisations: Sudan 
has more and older pyramids than Egypt; Ethiopia has 
ancient Semitic languages and Hebraic faiths, and some 
of the longest-established Christian communities in the 
world; the Prophet Mohammed sent his companions to 
seek asylum on the southern shores of the Red Sea (which 
they received); and the city of Harar is one of Islam’s 
holiest sites. Kenya, South Sudan and Uganda all have 
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great diversity within their borders. The region today is 
evenly divided between Christians and Muslims, with 
significant numbers of ‘noble spiritual believers’ (to use the 
apt terminology of the 1973 Sudanese constitution, more 
accurate and respectful than the commonly-used and 
misleading term ‘animists’), notably in South Sudan and 
south-west Ethiopia. Ethiopia possesses several 
indigenous scripts, and there is more linguistic diversity 
within the Nuba Mountains of Sudan than in the entire 
African continent south of the Equator. While the Somali 
people, spread over four or five countries in the HoA (and 
now with a global diaspora) possess a common language 
and culture, there are also significant diverse minorities in 
Somalia, especially in the riverian areas of the south of the 
country. And the Rift Valley is of course the site of the 
oldest identified human ancestors on the planet. 
 
Most of the peoples of the HoA have multiple identities: 
they have allegiance to nations, to ‘nationalities’ (the 
Marxist language of historically-constituted identity 
remains current in Ethiopia, which has a constitution, 
adopted in 1995, which awards its constituent nationalities 
the right of self-determination), to ethnicities, to faiths, to 
livelihoods and to communities. These identities are 
multiple not only in that people can call on different identity 
markers depending on context, but also in that individuals 
and communities are flexible and creative in the ways in 
which they self-identify. Political projects that try to 
enforce unitary ethnic or religious identities on people, do 
violence to the subtle and flexible nature of allegiances. 
However, the same richness of identities in the HoA means 
that there are many different entry points for moral 
populist mobilisation. 
 
Ethnic Politics 
 
The main historic model of peripheral governance by the 
empires based on the Nile and in the Ethiopian highlands, 
and their colonial era variants, was one of indirect rule or 
administrative tribalism. Local chiefs were appointed or 
promoted, and their authority regulated and reinforced. 
Under British colonialism, tribal chiefs became local 
despots, combining executive and judicial power limited 
only by what their colonial masters could tolerate 
(Mamdani 1996). Insofar as chiefs were also able to 
interpret custom to their advantage, and thereby dictate 
the content of ‘customary laws’, they were also legislators 
(Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983). And insofar as they were 
agents of pacification, policing and counter-insurgency, 
they were also military agents. By these mechanisms, 
ethnic identities were created and solidified during the era 
of imperial consolidation. But it would be an error to see 
identity politics solely as manipulation by the powerful: 
local people were also able to utilise identity labels in order 
to constrain the power and legitimacy of their chiefs, 
compelling them to serve as brokers between local 
communities and the state (Fearon and Laitin 2000; 
Leonardi 2015). Identity politics also provides for a 
measure of accountability of leaders. A leader cannot 
invoke identity politics, whether ethnicity or religion, 
without making an implicit covenant with the more 
authentic custodians of those identities, such as chiefs, 
priests and prophets. Those custodians can, invoking 
values and followers, then call politicians to account. 
 
This social and historical landscape provides fertile ground 
for ethnic politics, as does the physical landscape (Reid 
2011). Kinship relations provide the basis for security and 
trust in times of insecurity, and for political-military 
mobilisation—and a measure of accountability. The 
multiple purposes served by ethnic identification in times 
of insecurity, means that armed conflicts typically become 
shaped by ethnic politics. 
 
Nationalism: A sleeper issue? 
 
The language of nationalism and self-determination was 
prominent in the HoA in the period of decolonisation up 
until the 1980s, and it has been one of the most 
conspicuous features of political discourse in the region 
(Bereketeab 2015) which has had more secessionist 
movements than the rest of the continent put together 
(Englebert 2009). However, nationalism meant very 
different things in different countries (Lewis 1983). In 
Somalia, nationalism consisted not only in decolonisation 
but the (re)unification of the five Somali territories of 
(Italian) Somalia, (British) Somaliland, (French) Djibouti, 
the Kenyan north-eastern district, and the Ethiopian 
Ogaden. Somali nationalism appealed to the concept of a 
primordial Somali ethnic identity, glossing over the 
differences among Somalis, especially in the south of the 
country (Healy 1983). In Eritrea, nationalism consisted of 
an attempt to forge a common identity among the diverse 
groups that coexisted within the territory carved out by 
Italian colonists, in opposition to Ethiopia (Abbay 1998; 
Gebre-Medhin 1989; Mesfin 2017). As a country that had 
not been colonised, Ethiopian nationalism did not possess 
the element of decolonisation, but rather took two 
conflicting forms: the pan-Ethiopian nationalism of 
(re)establishing a historic empire based in the northern 
highlands, and the subaltern nationalism of suppressed 
groups (primarily Oromo and Tigray) claiming the right of 
self-determination against a feudal land empire (Hassen 
1990; Holcombe and Ibssa 1990; Donham and James 
1986; Chanie 1999). Tigrayan and (especially) Amhara 
politicised identities have emerged from interaction with 
the state, armed movements and most recently state 
politics of identity (Abbay 1998; Adhana 1999; Teka 1999). 
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In Sudan and South Sudan, nationalism and self-
determination have been indeterminate and shape-
shifters, as the very idea of a ‘Sudanese’ identity migrated 
historically from a centre of gravity among detribalised 
southerners and Nuba, to a political, cultural and economic 
elite historically associated with the middle Nile Valley and 
Egypt. In a country in which colonisation took on different 
shades (c.f. Troutt-Powell 2003), so too decolonisation has 
been a complex and shaded affair. 
 
In the last twenty years, nationalism has not been a 
preferred frame of analysis for politics in the region, 
despite the fact that two new countries (Eritrea and South 
Sudan) have been recognised on the basis of their 
respective claims to national self-determination. Rather, 
analysis has shifted to sub-national identity units. Notably, 
the differences within the Somali population and in 
particular the discrimination against minorities in the 
south of the country, have become the topic of much 
attention. Somalia’s African neighbours have not wanted 
to recognise or foster a pan-Somali nationalism that 
caused them so much trouble in the past. However, the 
question of Somali national identity has not disappeared: 
what it means to be a Somali remains a very salient 
question, and Somali politicians increasingly refer to a 
common national identity. Eritrean nationalism became 
closely associated with the political dominance of the 
Eritrean People’s Liberation Front and its leader Isaias 
Afeworki. But the recent performance of the Afeworki 
government has not led Eritreans to abandon their 
nationalist sentiment and the Eritrean state still maintains 
a tight control over the key instruments of control, leading 
some to speculate that forms of modernist nation-building 
are still in prospect (Hepner and O’Kane 2009; 
Woldemikael 2009). In Ethiopia, the 1995 formula of a 
‘nation of nations’ has become unmoored from its original 
Leninist theorisation and instead been supplanted by an 
everyday ethnic primordialism in national politics, which 
the ruling party struggles to manage. Leading members of 
the EPRDF do not even appear to be familiar with the 
theoretical underpinnings of their country’s distinctive 
form of federalism, assuming that the label ‘ethnic 
federalism’—originally dismissed by the EPRDF as an 
insulting simplification—is indeed correct. Given the 
remarkable resilience of the nation-state as the popularly-
accepted framework of political life, we can expect to see 
new forms of nationalism resurgent in each of these 
countries. 
 
Rival Islamisms 
 
Different visions for social and political Islam have long co-
existed within the HoA, at times in a state of mutual 
tolerance, at other times in conflict (de Waal 2004). This is 
particularly salient within Sudan, which provides an 
important case study for the political management of 
Islamism.  
 
Historically, Sudanese Islam has been dominated by Sufi 
orders, and by a Mahdist tradition, particularly strong in the 
western provinces. The major Sufi sects in the country 
have followed different political strategies: the Khatmiyya 
sect aligning itself with a politically and commercially 
powerful class; the Tijaniyya politically quietistic; and the 
Mahdists (Ansar) seeking to build a revolutionary 
millennial state. Although not a sect in the traditional 
sense, the colonial and post-colonial neo-Mahdists have 
functioned as one, with the descendants of the Mahdi also 
serving as leaders of the Umma Party. Numerous other 
variants of Sufiism, some with political profile, have also 
existed, ranging from the followers of Ali Betay in eastern 
Sudan, who established conservative, self-sufficient 
communities, to the Republican Brothers of Ustaz 
Mahmoud Mohamed Taha, who developed a unique hybrid 
of traditionalism and pluralism. 
 
The colonial state in Sudan was never fully secularised, as 
the British made strategic alliances with Sufi leaders, and 
two of the three largest political parties at the time of 
independence were associated with the Khatmiyya and 
Mahdists respectively (the third was the Communists). 
This meant that when the Muslim Brothers established a 
Sudanese branch, they found that they could not follow the 
strategy that had been so successful in Egypt, of being the 
sole claimants to the mantle of Islam. The Muslim 
Brothers had to compete with other Islamisms. They did 
so by adopting a modernist, democratic and pluralist 
approach (El-Affendi 1991). Under the charismatic, 
intellectual and mercurial leadership of Hassan al-Turabi, 
the Sudanese Muslim Brothers were endlessly creative, 
flexible and opportunistic—and often divided. 
 
The Sudanese Muslim Brothers were divided on key 
questions, and ultimately split along three axes. One was 
whether or not to adopt an exclusively democratic strategy 
or whether they should make alliances with the military. A 
second controversy was whether Islamism is necessarily 
aligned with Arabism, or whether there can be an African 
Islamism. A third question was whether or not Islamists 
can function within a secular or a multi-religious state, or 
must insist on an Islamic state. After 1989, in power 
courtesy of Islamist military officers, Sudanese Muslim 
Brothers were exceptional in their efforts to embrace the 
widest range of political Islamisms, including Iran. The 
Popular Arab and Islamic Congress (PAIC), set up in the 
wake of the 1990-91 Gulf War as a challenge to the 
Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), embraced 
many who were shunned by the conservative guardians of 
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the OIC. The PAIC welcomed not only Shia organisations 
but Al-Qaida, which was initially more a social support 
organisation for veterans of the Afghan campaign of the 
1980s, than a terrorist organisation per se. 
Perhaps because of the vibrancy of its Islamist intellectual 
climate, Sudan has proved inhospitable grounds for 
Salafism. In Ethiopia and Somalia, however, Wahhabis 
have made enormous headway against Sufiism, assisted 
by the formidable financial and cultural resources available 
in the Gulf countries. This is seen in the transformation of 
dress codes for Muslim women, and in the near-complete 
takeover of mosques and Islamic schools by Wahhabis. 
Somalia has become heavily islamised in the last 25 years: 
all aspiring Somali politicians must be publicly devout. Al-
Shabaab as the most militant manifestation of this: it is a 
deviant manifestation of Islamism but nonetheless draws 
its legitimacy from the thorough-going Islamisation of 
public life.  
 
Eritrea is an interesting counter-example, where state 
hostility towards any form of politicised religion has kept 
fundamentalism at bay, while Pres. Afeworki has 
continued to deal politically with Arab states including 
Saudi Arabia and Qatar (although relations with the latter 
are under strain). 
 
In the last decade, differences among Islamists in the 
Greater Middle East have become a significant driver of 
Islamist politics in the HoA. There have been two 
components to this. One is the competition between Saudi 
Arabia and Iran. Because there are no significant Shia 
communities in the HoA, there have been no outbreaks of 
armed conflict directly attributable to this rivalry, unlike 
Yemen, where the Saudis felt obliged to intervene militarily 
in opposition to the Houthi insurgency. However, the 
Saudis have used their considerable financial and political 
muscle to compel Sudan, Djibouti and Somalia to close 
down Iranian diplomatic and cultural missions, and to 
minimise political, commercial and military links to Iran. 
The second element is the competition between Turkey 
and Qatar (on the one hand), which support the Muslim 
Brothers, and Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE (on the 
other), which are resolutely opposed to them. This 
competition is most notable in Somalia, where these two 
blocs vie for influence, using political funding as their main 
tool. Somaliland, which earlier this year agreed a 
combination of about $750m in deals with the UAE for 
Berbera port and related infrastructure, and a military base, 
has severed ties with Qatar, while the government in 
Mogadishu has resisted taking sides. 
 
 
 
 
Transnational Drivers of Armed 
Conflict 
 
Over recent decades, it has been impossible to ignore the 
transnational drivers of armed conflicts in the HoA/Red 
Sea area.  
 
The HoA has a long catalogue of inter-state boundary 
disputes, active and latent, and other international 
conflicts, including countries sponsoring proxies against 
one another, fighting bilateral disputes in the territory of a 
third country (e.g. the Ethiopian attacks on Eritrean military 
advisors in Somalia in 2006), and non-state groups that 
range over different territories (e.g. the Lord’s Resistance 
Army, which has been active in Uganda, South Sudan, DRC 
and CAR, and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) 
which has been active in Sudan, Chad, CAR, Libya and 
South Sudan, involving itself in internal conflicts in Chad 
and CAR at minimum). Most of these inter-state military 
actions remained un-documented and/or do not appear in 
the standard databases of conflicts, and so escape 
conventional political analysis.  
 
There is very little scholarship on transnational violent and 
coercive politics in Africa, so that rigorous attempts to 
explain the prevalence of these conflicts are scarce 
(exceptions include McGinnis 1999, Cliffe 2004, de Waal 
2004, Reid 2009, and Bereketeab 2013). It is plausible to 
hypothesise that boundary disputes and proxy wars 
(supporting insurgents in neighbouring countries) are 
symptoms of inter-state rivalries for position in a power 
hierarchy. However, each transnational armed conflict has 
its own complex history, and it is equally possible that the 
high prevalence of these conflicts derives from the 
accumulation of unresolved disputes.  
 
A list of cross-border violent incidents involving 
governments of the countries of the Horn between 1960 
and 2015 runs to a minimum of 92 cases (Twagiramungu 
2017). The exercise of cataloguing and analysing these 
conflicts will be continued and deepened as part of the 
CRP research. The following are the major recent and 
current cases of boundary disputes:  
 
 Ethiopia-Eritrea: the most hotly disputed and 
politically salient unresolved inter-state war, with the 
Ethiopian refusal to accept the decision of the Eritrea-
Ethiopia Boundary Commission over the town of 
Badme, whose occupation in 1998 was the casus belli, 
standing in the way of a permanent settlement of the 
boundary; 
 Eritrea-Djibouti: a boundary dispute that has led to 
war, mediated by Qatar until the latter’s withdrawal in 
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2017 after Djibouti and Eritrea downgraded relations 
with Doha markedly under Saudi pressure; 
 Sudan-South Sudan: multiple disputes, including 
recurrent armed conflict over Abyei, disputes over five 
other disputed areas, and several areas claimed by 
South Sudan including Heglig, which led to war in 
2012; 
 Ethiopia-Somalia: although the Ethiopian boundary 
with Somaliland was settled with the British during the 
post-war period, Ethiopia and independent Somalia 
fought two wars over the boundary with former Italian 
Somalia, which remains unsettled; Somali 
ambivalence about Ethiopian influence in Somalia is 
linked to the border issue, and the Ethiopia-Somalia 
Faultline has been the major axis of insecurity in the 
region since the 1960s. 
 South Sudan-Kenya: a long-standing border dispute 
over the Ilemi Triangle, not currently active; 
 South Sudan-Uganda: South Sudan has made claims 
along the border, which have led to local conflicts; 
 Sudan-Egypt: a long-running dispute over the Halaib 
Triangle, which has intermittently led to armed 
clashes; this dispute has the celebrated anomaly of 
the ‘unclaimed’ territory of Biir Tawiil; 
 Somalia-Somaliland: the Somaliland Republic claims 
that its boundaries are those of the former colonial 
territory, while the Somali region of Puntland claims 
the areas inhabited by Daarood clans. 
 Somalia-Kenya: emergent dispute over the maritime 
boundary; 
 Eritrea-Yemen: dispute over the Hanish Islands led to 
war in 1995, and although the issue has in principle 
been settled by the International Court of Justice, it 
may yet recur. 
 
The AU, using the AU Border Programme, is seeking 
systematically to delineate and demarcate borders and to 
minimise the potential for inter-state conflict. One of the 
more successful examples of this is the process of 
finalising the status of the Ethiopia-Sudan boundary, a long 
and contentious border which is characterised by many 
places in which the nationals of one country reside in the 
territory of the other. The maritime boundary between 
Sudan and Saudi Arabia is also held up as a model for the 
mutually consensual management of shared seabed 
resources. 
 
The implication of the ubiquity of inter-state conflicts and 
contests, and the involvement of neighbouring states in 
each and every internal conflict, means that any peace 
negotiations to resolve an internal conflict requires (at 
minimum) a pre-negotiation among the regional powers 
and stakeholders to resolve, or accommodate, their 
political differences. 
 
Regional Power Rivalries 
 
Reflecting the scarcity of primary scholarship on inter-
state conflict in Africa, there are no comparative or 
theoretical studies of the underlying causes of such 
conflicts. The transnational violent and coercive politics 
dataset, developed by the World Peace Foundation, can be 
analysed in order to examine patterns and test 
hypotheses.  
 
One plausible hypothesis is that conflicts reflect 
competition for ranking in regional power hierarchies. This 
would argue that inter-state conflicts occur when one or 
both governments seek to settle an unclear power 
hierarchy in their favour. Thus, Somalia’s invasion of 
Ethiopia in 1977 would be seen as the seizure of a strategic 
opportunity when Ethiopia was seen to be weak. The Ethio-
Eritrean war of 1998 would be seen as a dispute over 
which state was to play the dominant role vis-à-vis the 
other and in the wider region. The Sudan-Chad war of 
2006-09 would be interpreted as the military renegotiation 
of the relationship between those two countries, as Chad 
rose from the status of client state to one of co-equal. The 
South Sudan-Sudan war of 2012 would be interpreted 
primarily as a South Sudanese attempt to exert political 
primacy over Khartoum. (Other examples of proxy 
conflicts, for example in South Sudan and Somalia, could 
also be included.)  
 
A second hypothesis would be that inter-state and 
transnational conflict arises from internal causes, with 
conflicts spilling over boundaries. The region’s borders cut 
through territories traditionally occupied by identity groups 
(e.g. the Somalis, divided into five; the Beja divided 
between Eritrea and eastern Sudan; the Nuer divided 
between Gambella state in Ethiopia and adjoining areas of 
South Sudan, etc.) Conflicts involving these identity groups 
will tend to have political repercussions on the other side 
of the border, including refugee flows, and rebels at 
minimum seeking safe refuge in the neighbouring country 
and at most seeking state sponsorship of their cause. 
 
A third explanation would be that external factors (e.g. the 
Cold War, the war on terror, or the Saudi-Iran conflict) serve 
to exacerbate conflicts within the Horn, with national 
governments becoming proxies for global or extra-regional 
powers, or using the latters’ support to make political and 
military claims. 
 
A final hypothesis is that the long and complex history of 
unresolved conflicts, many of which involve disputed 
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borders, means that conflicts commonly have a 
transnational element. 
 
Each of these hypotheses could be investigated using a 
mixture of case studies and quantitative analysis using the 
TVCPA dataset. It may be that some transnational drivers 
are more important in some cases, and less so in others. 
Thus, to give an arbitrary example, shared ethnicity may be 
a more important factor in conflict spillover between South 
Sudan and DRC, while sponsorship of proxies in order to 
establish a regional power hierarchy may be more 
important for Gulf countries’ involvement in Somalia. The 
relative significance of these causes has important 
repercussions for international policy and practice. 
 
Extra-Regional Drivers of Conflict 
 
The Horn is influenced by armed conflicts outside its 
region, notably in Yemen, Libya, DRC, and CAR, and also 
intense political competition, such as between Saudi 
Arabia and Iran, and recently among the GCC countries. 
These are significant in several ways. First, they have spill-
over effects such as refugees. Second, IGAD member 
states are actively involved in some of them (e.g. Sudan 
and Eritrea are members of the Saudi-Egypt-UAE coalition 
in Yemen; Uganda has been engaged in DRC; Sudan and 
South Sudan have forces directly or indirectly involved in 
CAR). Third, the military, political and financial investment 
made by extra-regional parties, can change political 
dynamics in the HoA. For example, the resources provided 
by some GCC countries to Eritrea, has worried Ethiopia, 
and the funds provided by Arab countries to Somali 
politicians ahead of that country’s recent elections, has 
been cause for concern by the African countries that are 
seeking to influence a political settlement in Somalia. 
 
The HoA remains a focus for American, European and 
Asian strategic interest. In 2003, the U.S. established 
Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti, as the headquarters of the 
Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HoA), 
the U.S. military’s only permanent presence on the African 
continent. It was initially under CENTCOM and was 
transferred to AFRICOM in 2008. From Djibouti, the U.S. 
flies aircraft and drones on missions in Yemen and 
Somalia. The U.S. has six other drone bases in the Horn 
(Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya) and has had troops 
stationed in Uganda in support of Ugandan efforts against 
the Lord’s Resistance Army (this mission is due to close in 
September 2017). France also maintains a Foreign Legion 
base in Djibouti. The European Union is engaged in naval 
patrols off the Somali coast and related anti-piracy 
activities. China has recently signed a lease on a base in 
Djibouti, to serve as a logistical base for maritime and 
military operations. In addition, Saudi Arabia has also 
announced a base in Djibouti, while the UAE has existing 
bases in Eritrea and Somalia, and recently agreed a new 
base in Berbera. Turkey is also to open a base in 
Mogadishu. 
 
Historically, international actors have been a cause for 
instability in the region, notably in the 1970s when 
superpower rivalry exacerbated the Ethiopia-Somalia 
dispute, and when there was an initiative to make the Red 
Sea an ‘Arab lake’. A stable peace and security order may 
be more difficult when external actors are assertively 
pursuing their interests. As described by Nawaf Obaid 
(2014), in what is an unofficial document but nonetheless 
comes closest to an articulation of a Saudi defence 
doctrine, the withdrawal of the U.S. security umbrella from 
the greater Middle East necessitates a new Saudi 
assertiveness, including the establishment of a Red Sea 
fleet and a wider security perimeter that involves both 
shores of the Red Sea. Meanwhile, the UAE has also 
become much more assertive about its wider strategic 
interests, notably including the security of the Indian Ocean 
and a commitment to Saudi leadership of the peninsular 
(Hokayem and Roberts 2016, Taddele 2017). 
 
Maritime Security 
 
The HoA is adjacent to some of the world’s most important 
sea lanes, notably the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, 
through which most of Europe’s maritime trade with Asia 
must pass. The Suez Canal was closed twice in modern 
history: briefly in 1956 and for a longer period after the 
1967 war. The closure had a profound impact on world 
trade, with a major increase in shipping costs from the 
Middle East, Asia and East Africa to Europe (Feyrer 2009; 
The Gamming 2014). The increase in trade costs affected 
Ethiopia particularly severely and was one reason for an 
economic downturn that contributed to unrest and the 
1974 revolution. 
 
For this reason there is considerable international 
attention to maritime security. This has included 
multinational naval task forces to combat Indian Ocean 
piracy. There is an additional risk of maritime terrorism, 
from groups that have access to the coastline in Yemen or 
Somalia. Ship owners fear that armed conflicts on either 
shore of the Red Sea could lead to a belligerent party 
threatening vessels with artillery fire or mines, in order to 
extract concessions from governments or companies. 
Such fears contribute to the militarisation of the Red Sea 
with major trading countries seeking to establish naval 
bases in the area to protect their interests. 
 
The Red Sea is particularly important for Egypt, which is 
heavily reliant on revenues from ships passing through the 
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Suez Canal, has invested heavily in the expansion of the 
Canal to take larger ships, and which has historically 
regarded the security of the shipping lanes as its own 
exclusive responsibility. This is a particularly striking 
example of a general feature of Red Sea politics, which is 
that all players have a shared interest in maritime security, 
but the mechanisms for coordination and implementation 
are lacking. 
Economics and Natural Resources 
 
Transboundary Natural Resources 
 
The River Nile has historically been a source of both 
conflict and cooperation among the riparian states (Schulz 
2007). Recent tensions between Ethiopia and Egypt over 
the Nile Waters, consequent on the building of the Grand 
Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), have revived 
concerns over the regional politics of the Nile Valley 
(Kameri-Mbote 2007). The World Bank’s Nile Basin 
Initiative (NBI) has been remarkably successful in 
generating consensus among the relevant ministries of 
riparian states on how best to manage this shared 
resource (Salman 2010), even though Egypt has kept its 
distance from the major NBI commitments. In March 
2015, Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan signed a declaration of 
principles over the waters of the eastern Nile Basin. 
However, Egyptian-Ethiopian disputes over the Nile waters 
have not been concluded.  
 
These tensions and contestations need to be analysed, not 
just as inter-state water diplomacy, but also as exercises 
in governance and power within countries. Control over 
water is not merely an issue of national interest, but of the 
political and economic interest of certain groups in society 
and in government. In Egypt and Sudan, there are well-
established ‘hydrocracies’—citadels of technical expertise 
exercising great power over the policy-making process 
(Molle et al. 2009; Mirumachi 2015). In the Sudanese case, 
the Gezira irrigated scheme has been at the centre of 
statebuilding for a century (Barnett and Abdelkarim 1991), 
though in the 2000-14 period this hydrocracy was 
circumvented by a politically-well connected Dams Unit 
that pursued both a more ideologically Islamist agenda 
(Verhoeven 2015) and also played an important role in 
recycling funds for political purposes. Ethiopia has no 
established hydrocracy, but is fast establishing one as a 
component of its developmental strategy. 
 
The negotiations over shared water resources, and 
especially the river Nile, can be seen in three ways. The first 
is as an arena of inter-state bargaining in order to achieve 
a regional public good (i.e. the best common management 
of a shared resource) with positive externalities (positive 
sum economic outcomes and the development of trust 
and cooperation among states). This is the dominant 
international approach (Salman 2010).  
 
The second is as a contest between different visions of 
what the public good should consist in: a technocratic 
maximisation of water control, or a broader ecosystem-
wide management of a fragile and changing system 
(Lankford 2015; Mirumachi 2015).  
 
Thirdly, the Nile waters negotiations can also be seen as 
an arena for political bargaining in which technical water 
concerns are intermixed with, or subordinated to, other 
political concerns such as national security, populist 
mobilisation, or political financing. Thus Egypt’s 
hydropolitics is intermixed with national security 
calculations, and occasionally takes a populist turn, for 
example in the last days of the Mohammed Morsi 
government, when the beleaguered regime sought to 
mobilise nationalist sentiment on the Nile waters issue. 
Sudan’s readiness to take the side of Ethiopia rather than 
Egypt in the dispute is linked to the fact that the principal 
beneficiary of expanded irrigation from the GERD will be 
Sudan, and the Sudanese government had already sold the 
land leases for much-needed cash, and could therefore not 
afford to abandon its support for the dam. 
 
Ethiopia’s ‘Economy First’ National Security Strategy 
 
The countries of the region have radically different 
resource endowments, in terms of agriculture, water, 
minerals, and potential for power. This creates potential 
for complementarities of economic strategy along with 
likely strains if a policy of market integration were to be 
pursued (Healy 2011). The regional political economy of 
the HoA therefore needs to be analysed in a manner 
distinct from (e.g.) the East African Community and the 
Economic Community of West African States. The HoA is 
also distinctive in that Ethiopia—the country at its 
geographic centre, and potentially its hegemon—has 
embarked upon an extremely ambitious state-led 
development strategy, which is closely integrated into its 
national security strategy. 
 
Ethiopia’s 2002 ‘Foreign Affairs and National Security 
Policy and Strategy’ (FDRE 2002) identified poverty 
reduction as the centre of its national security strategy. 
This has been described as an ‘economy first’ security 
strategy and also an ‘inside-out’ strategy, insofar as it 
builds upon an analysis of internal weaknesses before 
moving to external policies. Ethiopia’s policy of 
accelerated economic growth and achieving a ‘democratic 
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developmental state’ is premised on the view that the 
country’s weakness is rooted in its poverty. 
 
The Ethiopian strategy is state-led and infrastructural, 
rather than market-led. The objective is to establish shared 
infrastructure with its neighbours, notably transport and 
power grids, with the economic objective of better utilising 
the comparative advantages of neighbours in certain 
sectors, given their contrasting resource endowments, and 
the political objective of establishing common interests 
based on these shared infrastructural investments. The 
strategy does not involve dismantling barriers to trade or 
permitting the free movement of people, as the disparities 
in economic development would, it is feared, disadvantage 
the less developed countries, notably Ethiopia itself. Kenya 
and Sudan have embraced this initiative, opening power 
interconnectors, and in Kenya’s case, an additional 
programme of roadbuilding to better connect Ethiopia to 
Kenyan ports. (A special status agreement signed in 2013 
between Kenya and Ethiopia has yet to be ratified in 
Nairobi.) 
 
Accelerated growth also brings significant tensions, 
notably over land (with conflicts arising from large-scale 
land acquisition in all countries) and water (see above). 
The Ethiopian government has recently recognised the 
need to revise and update its foreign policy strategy 
(Gebreluel 2017). 
 
The Political Economy of Ports 
 
Ethiopia is the world’s most populous landlocked country, 
and is dependent for access to the sea on ports in the 
territories of countries that have historically been 
antipathetic to it. (It also has one of Africa’s largest 
shipping lines, a legacy of earlier days when it did have 
seaports.) Central to Ethiopia’s economic-security strategy 
is diversifying its access to the sea, through infrastructural 
investment and building diverse alliances.  
 
This has far-reaching implications for peace and security 
in the HoA region, which can best be analysed by 
understanding the position of Djibouti, and the potential 
tensions that may arise through the expansion of Dubai 
Ports World (DPW) to have a controlling stake in a number 
of the ports in the Horn, in Djibouti and Somalia. 
 
The Government of Djibouti secures its main revenues 
from commercial and strategic-security rents: from port 
fees and from leasing its territory for military bases. It is 
leveraging its geo-strategic location and its reputation for 
stability to attract the investment of global powers and 
corporations (Styan 2013). It has French, U.S. and Chinese 
military bases on its territory (soon to be joined by Saudi 
Arabia). The recent opening of a Chinese naval base, the 
first overseas Chinese base, illustrates the importance of 
the Red Sea maritime route to China. The Djibouti Ports 
and Free Zones Authority (DPFZA), under the Presidency, 
has partnerships with international corporations, including 
the Dubai-based DPW to develop the new Doraleh multi-
purpose port. The state of Djibouti is thus run in large part 
as a commercial enterprise, translating part of its revenue 
streams into providing employment and services for its 
small population. The political and commercial interests of 
the external providers of rent ensure that the country is 
sufficiently well-managed to provide those public goods. 
As such, Djibouti is an exemplar of a mutually-beneficial 
public-private partnership, providing both political goods to 
its citizens and developmental outcomes. 
 
The expansion of DPW to have a controlling stake in 
several of the key ports for Ethiopia’s access to the sea—
most recently Berbera in Somaliland—has been cause for 
concern in Addis Ababa. While the UAE is seen not 
primarily as a commercial actor that is sympathetic to 
secularism (Taddele 2017), it is also emerging as a political 
and security actor (Roberts 2016). Ever suspicious of 
Egypt, Ethiopia’s approach to the UAE expansion into the 
Horn will depend on its perception of UAE-Egyptian 
alignments. For example, Ethiopia reportedly dropped 
objections to the recent agreement for an Emirati base at 
Berbera when language restricting its use to Emirati 
soldiers was included in the deal. 
 
Climate Change 
 
The HoA is vulnerable to environmental crisis, exacerbated 
by climate change. The HoA has an unusually complex 
ecological-climatic system, so that the impacts of global 
warming are particularly difficult to predict. It is likely that 
the northern and western parts of the region will become 
drier and the southern and eastern parts will become 
wetter, and the climatic variability will increase. This will 
cause stress to food production systems. Climate change 
may yet emerge as the greatest threat to human security 
in the region (Admassu et al. 2014). Ethiopia has pioneered 
the global South’s strategies for approaching responses to 
climate change (Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 
2011; Kaur 2013). There is a pressing need for the region 
to develop a coordinated response to the threats posed by 
climate change, especially one that engages the people of 
the region in the discussion. 
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Peace and Security Architecture  
 
The complexity of the HoA is manifest in the number of 
distinct but interacting levels of political conflict: local, 
national, regional and extra-regional. 
 
Contested Multilateralism and the Lack of a Security 
Community 
 
One of the striking features of the HoA/Red Sea region is 
the lack of a consensual security community. Thus, it not 
only means that the mechanisms for resolving conflicts 
within the region are weak (notably IGAD, see Woodward 
(2013b)), but there is an enduring threat to national and 
regional ownership of the region’s agenda. Powers outside 
the region (e.g. the P5 at the UN Security Council or the 
GCC) can take political decisions with major repercussions 
for the Red Sea including the HoA, without the interests of 
the region in mind. There is a pressing need for a wider 
multilateralism (a collective security mechanism involving 
not just the states of the region but those in adjoining 
regions) and a deeper multilateralism (involving security, 
economic, governance and democracy agendas). 
 
Emperor Haile Selassie was one of the most eloquent and 
prescient exponents of collective security and 
international law, famously in his 1936 speech at the 
League of Nations, and later for his pivotal role in enabling 
the formation of a single African inter-state entity, the 
Organisation of African Unity (no mean feat at the height 
of the Cold War in 1963). Ethiopia is a historic 
multilateralist, seeking to embed its foreign policies with 
multilateral institutions, and serving as host to the AU. 
Sudan was, with Ethiopia, a founder member of the 
Bandung Conference and the Non-Aligned Movement. But 
by the same token, multilateralism and multilateral 
institutions are treated with skepticism by others in the 
Horn. Eritrea was denied its right of self-determination by 
the UN and OAU; the territorial principle of uti possedites 
adopted by newly-independent African states in 1964, to 
respect inherited colonial boundaries, was vigorously 
disputed by Somalia (leading to two inter-state wars); and 
southern Sudanese felt they were defrauded of their right 
of self-determination by their northern brethren through 
the stratagems used to achieve national independence for 
Sudan in 1956 (rather than unity with Egypt).  
 
Today, the UN, AU and IGAD are seen by many Eritreans 
and Somalis as vehicles for power interests. Nonetheless, 
the inter-connected nature of the conflicts and governance 
problems in the HoA, and the involvement of the region in 
both the crises and the solutions to them, determines the 
need for an overall integrated and holistic regional 
framework.  
 
In 1996, the Heads of State and Government of the HoA re-
founded IGAD, broadening its mandate to include peace 
and security. This led to several studies, by, amongst 
others Leeds University and KPMG, and the establishment 
of a Peace and Security Division and a Programme on 
Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. Despite 
the sharp differences between IGAD member states—
notably Ethiopia and Eritrea—certain steps were taken. 
One was to set up a mechanism for conflict early warning 
and response (CEWARN), focusing on the less politically 
contentious issue of cross-border pastoralist populations. 
Another was to set in motion consultation towards a 
comprehensive peace and security plan. In turn this led to 
the Khartoum Conference to launch the IGAD Strategy on 
Peace and Security Discourse (IGAD 2007). 
 
The IGAD strategy is remarkable for its inclusiveness. It 
requires IGAD member states to define their national 
security goals and strategies and submit them to public 
review. It requires that the IGAD civil society forum and 
inter-parliamentary union be involved in developing the 
details. The strategy document specifies: 
 
New mechanisms to promote discussion and consensus-
building at all levels within the IGAD region should also 
be developed. 
 
 Discussion among IGAD Member States and other 
stakeholders to identify and agree upon core values 
for national security promotion; 
 Bringing the peace and security agenda to the CSO 
forum, the Inter-Parliamentary Union and national 
parliaments; 
 Promotion and facilitation of national peace and 
security promotion strategies and monitoring their 
development; 
 Identification of additional or remedial mechanisms 
to assist those nations that are facing difficulties in 
developing, implementing or monitoring a security 
promotion strategy; 
 Enabling the free movement of people throughout the 
region and developing norms for common citizenship; 
 Encouragement of citizens’ exchanges on issues of 
regional integration, conflict resolution and 
reconciliation, and the development of a culture of 
peace; and 
 Establishment of fora whereby the IGAD security 
promotion strategy can establish a dialogue with 
neighbouring or overlapping regions (east and central 
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Africa, Sahara and Sahel, Arab League, etc.). (IGAD 
2007, p. 12) 
 
More than a decade on, these recommendations remain 
as salient as ever. Moreover, they are not an anomaly: 
these links between inclusive processes, economic 
development, the governance of diversity and peace and 
security have been articulated by the AU. Indeed, the 
Constitutive Act of the African Union, Article 4(c) specifies 
‘participation of the African peoples in the activities of the 
Union.’ The issues of peace and security in the HoA are 
appropriate to be on the agenda of the Pan African 
Parliament and the African Union Economic, Social and 
Cultural Council (AU ECOSOCC). The need for the inclusion 
of a broader array of stakeholders, including academic 
institutions and civil society organisations, is also 
specified in the AU’s Livingstone formula (African Union 
2008) and the Tripoli Declaration (African Union 2009). 
 
But it is equally striking that neither the IGAD Secretariat 
nor its member states have taken even the first steps 
towards implementing the commitments. On the contrary, 
even the most basic elements of a workable peace and 
security mechanism for the HoA have seen regression 
rather than progress. Because Eritrea is suspended from 
IGAD, the organisation does not hold regular summits, but 
instead has extra-ordinary summits at which the heads of 
state and government meet to decide on pressing issues 
(most often South Sudan). The IGAD Secretariat does not 
function as a support to either the summits or to the peace 
and security commitments that the organisation has taken 
on, such as the South Sudan peace process. The chair of 
IGAD has been held by Ethiopia for nine years without 
rotation. 
 
IGAD is severely constrained in its ability to play the 
uncontested roles of custodian of norms, forum for 
conflict management, and arbiter of disputes. The 2013 
review of the EU-Horn strategic partnership observed, 
there is a: ‘lack of a regional security system able to make 
states feel secure with each other.’ (European Union 2013, 
p. 20)  
 
The African Union has stepped in to fill some of the gaps 
left by IGAD. The AU has taken on the role of mandating 
and coordinating the peace support operation in Somalia, 
which was initially envisaged as an IGAD operation. The AU 
High-Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP) for Sudan and 
South Sudan took on the role of facilitating the 
implementation of the Sudanese Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA) and the negotiations over the 
independence of South Sudan, a task that would logically 
have fallen to IGAD as the custodian of the CPA. However, 
the AUHIP’s role also led to jealousies among leading IGAD 
figures who saw themselves as being displaced, and who 
consequently rushed to take the lead in seeking to mediate 
in South Sudan in late 2013. 
 
Neither IGAD nor the AU has been able to manage the 
Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict, nor indeed other conflicts 
involving Eritrea such as its border dispute with Djibouti, 
where Qatar stepped in as mediator. Ethiopia has used 
IGAD, the AU and the UN as mechanisms for excluding 
Eritrea from having a voice in peace and security 
discussions. The AU is, in principle, the custodian of the 
2000 Algiers Agreement that ended the Ethio-Eritrean war, 
but has not been prepared to criticise Ethiopia’s failure to 
implement its commitments to the ruling by the Eritrea-
Ethiopia Boundary Commission. Neither IGAD nor the AU 
has had a relevant role in engaging with the repercussions 
of the Yemen war in the HoA. The requirement of a 
functional peace and security mechanism for the HoA has 
never been greater, nor more lacking. 
 
The HoA/Red Sea region demands not only a multilateral 
approach, but also an approach of multiple and 
overlapping multilateralisms. There are numerous 
overlapping multilateral organisations engaged in the Red 
Sea region: African, Arab, trans-regional, some political, 
some developmental, and some both: 
 
 African Union 
 Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
(COMESA) 
 Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) 
 East African Community (EAC) 
 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
 Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) 
 InterGovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) 
 International Conference on the Great Lakes Region 
(ICGLR) 
 League of Arab States (LAS) 
 Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) 
 Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) 
 
The need for a Red Sea forum or conference has long been 
recognised. The foreword to Roberto Aliboni’s book was 
written by Egypt’s Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, 
Boutros Boutros Ghali: ‘It is my earnest hope that one day 
soon a conference of all the littoral States of the Red Sea 
will be convened, giving new impetus to co-operation and 
solidarity among these states’ (Boutros-Ghali 1985, p. xi). 
He continued, ‘Solidarity is the only valid means available 
for transforming the Red Sea into a zone of peace, co-
operation and friendship, a factor of peaceful co-existence 
among the peoples of the area rather than a zone of 
instability, tension and confrontation.’  
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Peace Missions 
 
There is a growing literature on peace operations, 
especially in Africa (HIPPO 2015; WPF 2016). More than 
one third of the world’s peacekeepers are deployed in the 
HoA, in five missions. The Africa Mission in Somalia 
(AMISOM) currently has 22,000 uniformed personnel. The 
UN-AU hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID) has 17,000 but 
is drawing down. The UN Interim Security Force for Abyei 
(UNISFA) consists of an Ethiopian brigade with a strength 
of 4,000. The UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) is 
12,500. The Regional Cooperation Initiative for the 
Elimination of the LRA (RCI-LRA) is a coordination 
mechanism for the armed forces of the countries involved 
(CAR, DRC, South Sudan and Uganda) which has a target 
strength of 5,000. 
 
The EU is by far the largest contributor to the African Peace 
Facility (and thus the major donor to AMISOM), and EU 
member states fund a substantial proportion of UN 
peacekeeping missions in the region through their 
assessed contributions to the UN peacekeeping budget. 
Until 2015, the EU was providing 90 percent of funds for 
AMISOM, a quotient that it has now cut to 80 percent. The 
fact that the AU and the troop contributing countries have 
struggled to increase their proportion from 10 to 20 
percent, indicates the challenges that will face the AU if 
they are to implement the proposal to fund 25 percent of 
African peace operations’ costs, on which basis the UN 
Security Council will authorise the remaining 75 percent to 
be covered by UN Member States assessed contributions. 
 
Overall, international support to UN and AU peace 
operations is a major international investment in the peace 
and security of the region. Yet there is insufficient 
appreciation of how peace operations are deeply 
entangled in the politics of the region. Discussions on 
peace operations tend to be dominated by technical and 
operational considerations with the politics being 
downgraded, a tendency that recent reports such as the 
High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations 
(HIPPO) have sought to reverse. 
 
In earlier decades, armed conflicts were protracted and 
complex, with many proxies involved, and peace 
negotiations were scarce. The first Sudanese civil war was 
fought for ten years before the first (internal, Sudanese) 
peace initiative was floated, and sixteen years before the 
first international peace process began (in late 1971). 
There were no significant peace talks in the Ethiopian civil 
wars that followed the 1974 revolution until 1989. In both 
these cases, neighbouring countries and other powers 
were actively engaged in supporting either the government 
or the rebels. Today, almost every civil war has an ongoing 
peace process. In the case of the South Sudanese armed 
conflict, it began within a week of the outbreak of hostilities 
in December 2013. Such expedited engagement is, prima 
facie, welcome and to be supported. However, it also 
comes with complications. 
 
In the peace processes in (for example) Darfur, South 
Sudan, and Somalia, many of the same actors that would 
have been engaged in military support to one side or 
another in earlier years, are now involved in either the 
peace negotiations, peace support operations, or both 
(WPF 2016). It is reasonable to assume that these 
neighbouring states continue to have much the same 
interests as before, and therefore that the peace 
negotiations and peace operations are conducted with an 
eye to achieving the same objectives (de Waal 2017; Berhe 
and de Waal 2017), and that the security arrangements in 
peace agreements and peace operations reflect these 
interests. One of the research challenges for the CRP is to 
ascertain the extent to which peace missions do indeed 
hue to a normative conceptualisation of peacemaking, and 
the extent to which they are cross-border projections of 
political and military power. This is most evidently the case 
for AMISOM in Somalia (Wondemagegnehu and Kebede 
2017). It raises important questions regarding the doctrine 
of AU-led peace enforcement operations (Fitz-Gerald 
2017). 
 
The peace missions in the HoA have diverse mandates. 
AMISOM and the RCI-LRA are mandated by the AU PSC, 
with AMISOM’s mandate endorsed by the UNSC 
(resolution 1772 of 2007) and the RCI-LRA supported by a 
UNSC presidential statement (14 November 2011). Neither 
of these two missions is a peacekeeping mission: they are 
combat or counter-insurgency missions. Neither has a 
mandate that involves the protection of civilians (PoC) 
although their military objectives—defeating Al-Shabaab 
and extending the authority of the Somali government, and 
eliminating the LRA—may be said to entail an outcome that 
protects civilians. Each of the different troop contributing 
countries to AMISOM follows its own operational 
procedures, resulting in diverse outcomes in terms of 
respect for human rights and protection of civilians. 
Operation Linda Nchi, conducted by the Kenyan Defence 
Force (KDF) in Somalia in 2011, is pursued in support of 
various different political and security objectives 
(Anderson and McKnight 2014) and has been accused of 
violations of international humanitarian law (including 
attacks on civilian targets), and complicity with Al-Shabaab 
in smuggling activities (Journalists for Justice 2015). The 
KDF denies the allegations and argues that it must of 
necessity deal with the Somali commercial sector, 
observing that the alternative would be to drive 
businessmen into dealing exclusively with the insurgents. 
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The UN missions in the HoA (UNAMID, UNISFA and 
UNMISS) all have PoC mandates. In the case of UNAMID, 
PoC was the primary political rationale for the deployment 
of the mission in the first place, driven by international 
outrage over the mass atrocities in Darfur. With Sudanese 
governmental consent at best grudging, and UNAMID’s 
operational strategy focused on physical presence rather 
than problem-solving, the mission has not succeeded. The 
experience of UNAMID has been one of the examples that 
has informed the recommendation by the HIPPO to shift 
from a ‘military first’ to a ‘politics first’ approach (HIPPO 
2015). The conflict in South Sudan led to a rapid revision 
of UNMISS’s mandate to focus on PoC, including the 
unprecedented situation of about 200,000 civilians 
seeking sanctuary in the UN’s own military bases. As the 
AU develops its own approach to PoC, it is under pressure 
to adopt a doctrine that replicates that of the UN, but it is 
also arguable that the AU should not attempt to be a 
‘second best’ UN but should rather play to its own 
strengths, which lie more in the political than the 
operational (Conley 2017). 
 
Peace missions in their diverse forms will undoubtedly be 
a long-term element in the political and security landscape 
of the HoA for the foreseeable future. They need to be 
envisaged, not as time-limited and task-specific missions, 
but rather as ‘missions without end’ that function within 
the region’s turbulent political marketplace (de Waal 2009). 
Emergent Dynamics 
 
The War in Yemen 
 
The war in Yemen is both consequence and cause of the 
dynamics described. The war arose from the irresolvable 
internal tensions within a national political system run as a 
political marketplace, in which the ruler ran out of the 
wherewithal to regulate the political arena, and from 
Yemen’s position in the region and geo-strategically. 
 
The war in Yemen must be understood in the context of 
the country’s historic relations with Saudi Arabia. The 
boundary between the countries is arbitrary; the two share 
a long political and cultural history; many of the most 
powerful families in Saudi Arabia have Yemeni origins; and 
Yemeni political developments can have far-reaching 
ramifications for Saudi Arabia. In the 1960s, the Saudis 
feared that Yemen would be the route to a secular Arab 
nationalist takeover of the Kingdom. Since the rise of Al-
Qaeda in the 1990s this fear has been resurgent in 
different political colours. Saudi policy towards Yemen has 
been a mix of judicious distance, tactical monetary 
patronage and intermittent strong-arm measures (such as 
the fierce support for the Royalists in the 1960s civil war, 
the 1990 expulsion of Yemeni migrant workers, and the 
current intervention). On their side, Yemen’s rulers have 
sought to diversify external sources of support, in order to 
lessen dependence on Saudi Arabia. 
 
In 2014, the Saudis decided to intervene for a mixture of 
domestic and regional power motives, and the UAE came 
in to support the Saudis, subsequently taking on a leading 
role in some operations. The war in Yemen demands a 
political solution, but the Saudi-Emirati coalition seems 
determined to press its military options to the limit before 
they would be prepared to consider political alternatives. 
The war appears to be in a protracted stalemate, and even 
a purported military victory by the coalition would not 
resolve the underlying political problems. 
 
The outbreak of the Yemeni war has been the single most 
important factor that has generated renewed strategic 
interest in the Red Sea: this accompanied Saudi plans for 
a Red Sea fleet, and most recently Egyptian-Saudi pressure 
which led to Djibouti, Somalia and Sudan all cutting ties 
with Iran. Eritrea, Sudan and Somalia have contributed 
troops to the Saudi coalition, while Eritrea has allowed its 
territory—especially the port and airbase at Assab—to be 
used for air strikes into Yemen. 
 
The GCC Dispute 
 
The 2017 dispute between Saudi Arabia and the UAE, on 
one hand, and Qatar, on the other, was a remarkable 
escalation of long-standing differences among the GCC 
member states, rooted both in their particular histories and 
rivalries, and also in the contrasting approaches that they 
have taken to the questions of political Islam and relations 
with Iran. Of concern here is how this dispute has played 
out in the HoA. For Saudi Arabia and the UAE, the loyalty of 
the states that they see as their clients, is a matter of 
paramount importance. They demanded that the AU and 
its member states, notably in the HoA, take their side in the 
dispute, and came down hard on those that refused to do 
so—notably Somalia. The fact that Qatar did not quickly 
back down in the face of Saudi-Emirati demands, and 
instead took a defiant stand with the support of Turkey and 
Iran (and some within the U.S. government), means that 
the dispute is unlikely to be resolved quickly, and the stakes 
may increase.  
 
Under any scenario other than a rapid resolution of the Gulf 
dispute, the countries of the HoA would find themselves in 
an uncomfortable position, in which they would be 
vulnerable to punitive action by one side or the other, most 
likely pressure from the Saudi-Emirati coalition. This could 
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create instability in Somalia as those seen to have taken a 
pro-Qatari or pro-Turkish stand, or remained independent, 
could find their lines of political finance cut while those of 
their rivals are more generously funded. It could create a 
reality or a sense of isolation in Ethiopia, as Addis Ababa 
sees an Egyptian-linked effort to surround the country and 
cut it off from access to the sea. 
 
Other Issues 
 
The HoA/Red Sea region is prone to surprises. This is 
inherent in the nature of a complex system in which events 
at one level can cause repercussions at other levels. None 
of the countries can be considered stable. Eritrea will 
undoubtedly face a transition at some point, most likely a 
traumatic one. This needs to be a priority for research, 
especially as the international re-engagement with Eritrea, 
with the UN, EU and Arab countries all intensifying their 
contacts, allows for a greater flow of information and more 
opportunities for strategic analysis and planning, than 
have existed in the recent past. Ethiopia is in serious 
danger of losing its hegemonic status in the HoA, and 
other leaders in the region sense this and are ready to act 
accordingly. The prospects of instability within Ethiopia 
also cannot be ruled out. Sudan has managed to maintain 
a core of continuity over many years, managing its 
instability in a manner that does not have broader regional 
repercussions, but this also could change. 
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